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Abstract. As economic and emissions scenarios assume convergence of per capita incomes, they are
sensitivity to the exchange rate used for international comparison. Particularly, developing countries
are project to grow slower with a purchasing power exchange rate than with a market exchange rate.
Different exchange rates may lead to scenarios with very different per capita incomes. However, these
scenarios also assume convergence of energy intensities, which at least partly offsets the income
effect, so that scenarios with different exchange rates would differ less in greenhouse gas emissions.
Differences become smaller still if atmospheric concentrations and global warming is considered.
However, differences become larger again if one considers the costs of meeting a certain stabilisa-
tion target, as the gap between baseline and target is more sensitive to the exchange rate used than
the baseline itself. Differences also grow larger if one looks at climate change impacts, which are
determined not just by climate change but also by development. The sensitivity to the exchange rate
is purely due to imperfect data, imperfect statistical analysis of data, a crude spatial resolution, and
imperfect models.
1. Introduction
Recently, the IPCC SRES scenarios have been severely criticised (Castles and
Hendersen, 2003a,b; Castles, 2004). The data underlying the SRES scenarios are
largely based on market exchange rates (MER) for converting national currencies
into US dollars. Castles and Henderson argue that the appropriate conversion should
be based on purchasing power parity exchange rates1 (PPP). Under PPP, the gap
between rich and poor countries is smaller. Castles and Henderson argue that there-
fore the economic growth rate and hence the emissions growth rate would have
been smaller had the SRES scenarios been based on PPP. Climate change would be
much less of a problem. This conclusion and the ensuing debate, commenced by
the defensive attitude of the IPCC (IPCC, 2003; Nakicenovic et al., 2003; Gru¨bler
et al., 2004), attracted the attention of climate change policy makers, the press
(Economist, 2003a,b, 2004), and the sceptics (WCP, 2003).2 The IPCC’s defence
largely rests on Manne and Richels (2003; updated in Manne et al., forthcoming),
who use the MERGE model to show that the choice between PPP and MER indeed
alters carbon dioxide emissions, but that the differences are small compared to other
uncertainties, and that the differences get smaller if one moves from emissions to
concentrations to temperatures. This paper complements Manne and Richels (2003)
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by, first, repeating (and confirming) their analysis with a different model and then
looking into the implications of climate change damages and emission reduction
costs. Holtsmark and Alfsen (2004a,b, 2005) make essentially the same contribu-
tion and reach largely the same conclusion as do Manne and Richels (2003), but
with a less detailed model.
Before turning to the main analyses, a few words are in place on the context of
this research. The market exchange rate (MER) is the rate one gets at the bank or at
the airport if one swaps, say, dollars for rupees. The MER largely reflects the price
of money, a combination of the expected interest rate, the expected rate of inflation,
the expected rate of return on capital invested in different countries and expected
changes in the exchange rate. Differences in per capita income measured in market
exchange rates do not necessarily accurately reflect differences in living standards.
If one swaps dollars for rupees and travels to India, one is suddenly much richer.
That is, one can buy much more for the rupees in India than one could buy for
the dollars in the USA. This effect is particularly strong for countries that are not
well integrated in the international markets for goods and capital, which are mostly
poor countries. PPP exchange rates,3 on the other hand, measure the relative cost
of buying a standard basket of goods in different countries and can therefore be
used to measure differences in living standards, provided that the basket of goods
is representative. The PPP exchange rate is the price in rupees in India for, say, a
kilo of rice, a litre of milk and a haircut, divided by the price in dollars in the USA
for the same things. The PPP exchange rate is thus a better basis for international
welfare comparison than is MER, because it measures not the relative value of
money (as does MER), but rather the relative value of the things that money can
buy. However, PPP is harder to measure, and data coverage is substantially less.4
Besides, PPP is perhaps harder to explain to non-economists, as most people have
exchanged money at the market exchange rate, whereas few have tried to estimate
the relative price of a standard basket of goods.5 For those reasons, the economic
literature on climate change is largely based on MER.
An overlooked alternative to MER and PPP is the real exchange rate (RER),
or the barter rate of exchange. Like PPP, RER measures the differences in living
standards; however, RER is based on all traded goods, rather than on an arbitrarily
selected basket of goods. Conceptually, RER and PPP are the same. The PPP is
based on a sample of goods and services, whereas the RER is based on all goods
and services. Although RER is the theoretically preferred concept (Pant and Fisher,
2004) and the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002) report it (or rather its inverse,
the national price level), it is hardly used in practice.6
Per capita income in poor countries tends to be higher when measured in PPP
(or RER) than when measured in MER. Castles and Henderson (2003a,b) deduce
from this that developing country growth in the future would be slower under
PPP than under MER. This implicitly assumes convergence of per capita income.
The SRES scenarios and most economic models used for climate change policy
analysis (including the ones used in this paper) indeed assume convergence, so the
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critique by Castles and Henderson is valid. However, absolute convergence of per
capita income is supported by neither observations nor by state of the art growth
theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Nonetheless, in line with the climate change
literature, we assume convergence.
In the economic growth literature, absolute or σ -convergence of per capita in-
come means that poorer countries grow faster than do richer countries. It does not
mean that the income gap between rich and poor would be closed by a specific date
(e.g., 2100), only that it would tend to fall and would close eventually. Absolute con-
vergence would occur because, if all else is equal, investments in poorer countries
would yield a higher return. Unsurprisingly, empirical studies have convincingly
demonstrated that all else is not equal, and absolute convergence has not happened.
Conditional, club or β-convergence is observed, however. Here, similar countries
converge to the same income level. The clubs may diverge, however. Nakicenovic
and Swart (2000) do not state why the SRES scenarios all assume absolute con-
vergence. Not having been part of the SRES process, I can only speculate about
the reasons. A technical reason may be that the scenario-generating models have
only simple (and theoretically outdated) representations of economic growth, in
which convergence results (see Romer, 1996, for an introduction to growth theory).
A political reason may be that a scenario of convergence is easier to sell to policy
makers from poor countries.
Besides convergence of per capita income, the SRES scenarios also assume
convergence of emissions intensities. Castles and Henderson (2003a,b) overlook
this, but as Holtsmark and Alfsen (2004a,b, 2005) point out, switching from MER to
PPP exchange rates would increase emission projections, at least partially offsetting
the drop in emissions due to the income effect. Miketa and Mulder (forthcoming)
test the convergence assumption in energy intensities. They find weak evidence for
absolute convergence in the amount of energy used per dollar of income generated,
but strong evidence for conditional convergence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model used, FUND2.7.
Section 3 discusses scenarios of climate change, essentially reproducing Holtsmark
and Alfsen (2004a,b, 2005) and Manne and Richels (2003). Section 4 looks at the
implications for the impacts of climate change. Section 5 turns to emission reduction
costs. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
The model used is version 2.7 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negoti-
ation and Distribution (FUND). Version 2.7 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6,
described and applied by Tol (1999a–e, 2001, 2002a), except for the impact module,
which is described by Tol (2002b,c) and updated by Tol (2002d). A further differ-
ence is that the current version of the model distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions.
The current version of the model also includes emission reduction for nitrous oxide
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(N2O), not incorporated in earlier versions of FUND, as well as a new formulation
of methane (CH4) emission reduction.
As every other model, FUND had advantages and disadvantages. The main
disadvantage is that the economic component is very simple, so simple that income
and emissions scenarios are largely exogenous and exchange rates absent. This
makes the tool flexible, but some of the discussion in this paper is based on model
assumptions rather than model results. The main advantage of FUND is its elaborate
climate change impacts module. This allows me to extend previous analyses beyond
the global mean temperature.
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous per-
turbations. The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United
States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and
New Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle
East, Central America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. The model runs from 1950 to
2200 in time steps of one year. The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize
the climate change impact module. In FUND, the impacts of climate change are as-
sumed to depend on the impact of the previous year, this way reflecting the process
of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year
1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical and monetized impacts of
climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of the model runs.
The 22nd century is included to make sure that climate policies aimed at stabilizing
concentrations indeed achieve that goal.
The period of 1950–1990 is used for the calibration of the model which is
based on the IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994). The climate
scenarios for the period 2010–2200 are based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario,
which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992).
The scenarios concern the rate of population growth, economic growth, au-
tonomous energy efficiency improvements, the rate of decarbonization of the en-
ergy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon
dioxide from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide.
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact
of climatic change. Population decreases with increasing climate change related
deaths that result from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical
cyclones. Heat and cold stress are assumed to have an effect only on the elderly,
non-reproductive population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect
the number of births. Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of
the urban population among the total population is based on the World Resources
Databases (WRI, 2000). It is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship be-
tween urbanization and per-capita income which are estimated from a cross-section
of countries in 1995. Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world
also cause the population sizes to change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate
immediately and completely with the respective host population.
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The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. Thus, climate change
reduces the long-term economic growth, although for the short term the consump-
tion is particularly affected. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide
abatement measures.
The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy sup-
ply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be accelerated by abatement
policies.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact
of carbon dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the
impact of the damages to the economy and the population caused by climate change.
Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometri-
cally depleted:
Ct = Ct−1 + αEt − β(Ct−1 − C pre) (1)
where C denotes the concentration, E the emissions, t the year, and pre the pre-
industrial concentration. Table I lists the parameters for both gases.
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million
by volume, is derived from a five-box model:
Boxi,t = ρi Boxi,t + 0.000471αi Et (2a)
where
Ct =
5
∑
i=1
αi Boxi,t (2b)
Here αi denotes the fraction of emissions E (in million metric tons of carbon) that
is allocated to box i (0.13, 0.20, 0.32, 0.25 and 0.10 respectively) and ρ the rate
of decay of the boxes (ρ = exp(−1/life time). The life times in the boxes are ∞,
363, 74, 17, and 2 years respectively. This model is based on Maier-Reimer and
TABLE I
Parameters of equation (1) (based on Schimel et al., 1996)
Gas αa βb Pre-industrial concentration
Methane (CH4) 0.3597 1/8.6 790 ppbv
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 0.2079 1/120 285 ppbv
aThe parameter α translates emissions in millions of metric tons of CH4
or N2O into concentrations in parts per billion by volume.
bThe parameter β determines how fast concentrations return to their pre-
industrial (and assumed equilibrium) concentrations; the reciprocal of
β is the atmospheric life time of the gases in years.
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Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992). According
to this model, 13 per cent of total emissions remain in the atmosphere indefinitely,
while 10 per cent are removed within an average time period of two years.
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide is determined
based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a
geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF),
with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in
equilibrium by 2.5 ◦C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents, so:
Tt =
(
1 − 1
50
)
Tt−1 + 150
2.5
6.3 ln (2) RFt (3)
Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global mean temperature by
a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged over
14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also geometric,
with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50
years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess
temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996).
The climate impact module is based on Tol (2002b,c). The following impact
categories of climate change are considered: agriculture, forestry, sea level rise,
cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria,
dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhea, energy consumption, water resources, and
unmanaged ecosystems.
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases,
or they can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change,
these effects are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times
the annual per capita income. The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the
middle of the observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value
of emigration is set to be 3 times the per capita income (Tol, 1995, 1996), the
value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the host region
(Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are modeled
explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometer of dryland was
on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland
value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometer. Wetland losses
are valued at $2 million per square kilometer on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf.
Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per
capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the
value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes and subsequent
coastal squeeze.
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosys-
tems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of
impacts measured in their ‘natural’ units (cf. Tol, 2002b).
Climate change related damages can be attributed to either the rate of change
(benchmarked at 0.04 ◦C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked at 1.0 ◦C).
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Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation
(cf. Tol, 2002c).
Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, agriculture, and cardiovas-
cular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a climatic optimum
which is determined by a variety of factors, including plant physiology and the be-
havior of farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether the actual
climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum climate. Im-
pacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the optimum
climate. The optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential im-
pacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed
of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are
always negative (cf. Tol, 2002c).
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosys-
tems, water resources, malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modeled as
simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and do not change
sign (cf. Tol, 2002c).
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic
growth, and technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more
vulnerable, such as water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders
(with urbanization), and ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes).
Other systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption
(with technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and
water-borne diseases (with improved health care) (cf. Tol, 2002c).
Carbon dioxide emissions are calculated on the basis of the Kaya identity. Emis-
sions can be modified by policy measures, e.g. a carbon tax. The costs of emission
reduction are subject to learning by doing, so that emission abatement in early time
periods of the simulations reduces the costs of emission abatement in subsequent
periods. The exact specification is given by Tol (2002e).
3. Climate Change Scenarios
The basic scenario described above is based on market exchange rates. Figure 1
presents the natural logarithm of the ratio of per capita income in PPP (RER)
and MER as a function of the natural logarithm of per capita income measured
in MER. The data are for 1995. Clearly, as countries grow richer, the difference
between PPP (RER) and MER disappears. Based on the data displayed in Figure
1, a MER income elasticity of PPP (RER) of −0.28 (−0.31) is estimated. That is,
a 1% growth in MER income would result in a 0.72% (0.69%) reduction of the
PPP/MER (RER/MER) ratio. If we assume that the MER income growth assumed
in the scenario is correct, this implies that the PPP (RER) income growth is lower
by the same amount as the reduction in the PPP/MER (RER/MER) ratio. This is the
basis of the PPP (RER) income scenario.7 Figure 2 displays the per capita income
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Figure 1. The ratio of per capita income measured PPP and MER as a function of per capita income
in MER in 1995 (top panel) and the same for RER and MER (bottom panel). Source: WRI (200x),
Penn World Tables.
for two regions, China and Subsaharan Africa. In the MER scenario, the income is
lower at the start but rises faster. Growth is slightly slower using RER rather than
PPP.
The other main difference between the MER and PPP (RER) scenarios are the
assumptions on technological progress in the energy sector. Castles and Henderson
(2003a,b) seem to base their critique on the assumption that the rate of energy
efficiency improvement and decarbonisation is independent of the growth rate of
per capita income.8 However, one could also argue that the SRES and other climate
scenarios assume a high rate of technological progress in poor countries based on
the observation that their carbon intensity, that is, the amount of carbon dioxide
emitted per dollar of income earned, is much higher than in rich countries. In-
deed, Nakicenovic (2004), Van Vuuren (2004), and Holtsmark and Alfsen (2004a,b,
2005) argue that this would largely offset the different economic growth rate. This
deliberation leads to our two extreme PPP scenarios, named CAH and NVV. In
the CAH scenario, energy efficiency improvements and decarbonisation are as in
the MER scenario. In the NVV scenario, we alter the exogenous assumptions on
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Figure 2. Per capita income in Subsaharan Africa (top panel) and China (bottom panel) for the MER,
PPP and RER scenarios.
energy efficiency improvements and decarbonisation so that emissions are as in
the MER scenario. In the third PPP scenario (so named), the change in energy
efficiency improvement and decarbonisation is exactly halfway between the NVV
and CAH scenarios. For RER, we only use the two extreme emissions scenarios;
energy efficiency and decarbonisation in CAH’ equal those in CAH (this scenario
is used in only a limited way); energy efficiency and decarbonisation in the RER
scenario are such that they offset the change in economic growth. Table II shows
the six scenarios. Three scenarios, viz. MER, NVV and RER, share the same
TABLE II
Scenarios
Same climate scenario
Same economic scenario MER NVV RER
PPP
CAH CAH’
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Figure 3. The regional carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion (in billion metric tonnes
of carbon) according to the MER scenario (top left), the NVV scenario (middle left), the RER scenario
(middle bottom), the PPP scenario (top right), the CAH scenario (middle right) and the CAH’ scenario
(bottom right).
climate change but have different economic growth; also, three scenarios, viz.
NVV, PPP and CAH, share the same economic growth but have different climate
change.
Figure 3 shows the regional carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel com-
bustions for the six scenarios. The MER, RER and NVV have almost exactly
the same emissions; the differences are induced by the feedbacks in the model.
The CAH scenarios have substantially lower emissions, and the PPP scenario lies
somewhere in between (see also Table III); the CAH’ scenario has lowest emis-
sions as well as lowest economic growth. Interestingly, the change in emissions is
primarily in Asia. African and Latin American emissions change too, but not as
dramatically as Asian emissions. The reasons are that Asian emissions are larger
than those of the other developing continents, but more importantly that the dif-
ference between PPP (RER) and MER incomes is largest in Asia. So, the different
scenarios do not only have different total emissions, the regional distribution of
emissions is also very different; in fact, under PPP (RER), developing countries
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TABLE III
Scenario characteristics for the MER, NVV, PPP, CAH and RER scenarios, and fraction of the MER
scenario. Displayed are the carbon dioxide emissions in 2100 (MMTC) for the world and the non-
Annex I countries; the carbon dioxide concentration in 2100 (ppm); the global mean temperature
in 2100 (degree centigrade); the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions in the current
decade; carbon dioxide emission reduction in 2050 (fraction of baseline) for the Annex I and non-
Annex I countries; and the net present value of the carbon dioxide abatement costs (trillion US dollar,
consumption loss, discounted at 5%)
Reduction Costs
Emissions Non- Concen- Tempe- Marginal Emission non- Abatement non-
World Annex I tration rature cost Annex I Annex I Annex I Annex I
MER 36031 23333 871 3.24 7.2 0.41 0.54 2.80 5.65
RER 35754 22690 865 3.22 10.5 0.44 0.41 4.46 5.81
NVV 35270 22270 858 3.20 8.9 0.46 0.41 4.03 5.27
PPP 27117 15005 772 3.03 5.7 0.43 0.37 4.01 4.18
CAH 21772 10249 712 2.90 3.0 0.40 0.32 3.91 3.24
RER 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.46 1.09 0.76 1.59 1.03
NVV 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.99 1.24 1.12 0.76 1.44 0.93
PPP 0.75 0.64 0.89 0.94 0.80 1.05 0.67 1.43 0.74
CAH 0.60 0.44 0.82 0.90 0.43 0.97 0.59 1.40 0.57
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Figure 4. Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion according to the five scenarios,
from top to bottom MER, NVV, RER, PPP and CAH. Note that MER, RER and NVV are almost
indistinguishable.
contribute substantially less than do developed countries, with drastic implications
for the discussion on appropriate burden sharing for greenhouse gas emission
reduction.
Figure 4 shows global carbon dioxide emissions for 5 scenarios.9 Figure 5 shows
the resulting concentrations, and Figure 6 the corresponding global mean temper-
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Figure 5. Carbon dioxide concentrations according to the four scenarios, from top to bottom MER,
NVV, PPP and CAH. Note that MER and NVV are almost indistinguishable.
atures. Like Manne and Richels (2003), we find that the difference in emissions is
larger than the difference in concentrations, which in turn is larger than the differ-
ence in temperatures. This does not imply, however, that climate change is less of a
problem under PPP (RER) than under MER (cf. Section 4); nor that the difference
between PPP (RER) and MER gets smaller if one moves to indicators that matter
more to policy (cf. Section 5).
4. Impact and Vulnerability
Switching from MER to PPP (RER) would change our assumptions about future
economic growth in developing countries and may change our assumptions about
future emissions. Climate change impacts would therefore be different too. Impacts
do not just depend on climate change (exposure) but also on development (which
largely determines vulnerability).
FUND is unique among the current generation of integrated assessment models
in the attention it pays to climate change impacts and how development affects
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Figure 6. Carbon dioxide concentrations according to the five scenarios, from top to bottom MER,
NVV, RER, PPP and CAH. Note that MER, RER and NVV are almost indistinguishable.
vulnerability; this was already the case in the survey of Tol and Fankhauser (1998),
but the difference has grown larger. This feature allows us to investigate how a shift
from MER based to PPP (RER) based scenarios alters climate change impacts,
which presumably matters more than climate change itself.
A few changes need to be made to the model, however. A switch from MER to
PPP (RER) would lead us to believe that the income gap between rich and poor is
smaller, and that therefore convergence would be slower as well. On the other hand,
it would lead us to believe that poverty-related phenomena, such as a high share of
GDP in agriculture or the prevalence of infectious diseases, would persist at higher
levels of development. In FUND, vulnerability changes with per capita income.
This change is governed by sector-specific income elasticities, which are estimated
on a cross-section of country data. If we re-estimate these income elasticities on
PPP (RER) income data, their absolute value would fall. This adjustment was made
for water resources, agriculture, forestry, energy consumption, and cardiovascular
diseases. For vector-borne diseases, there is an income threshold above which
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Figure 7. The market (top panel) and non-market (bottom panel) impacts of climate change on China
according to the four scenarios, viz. MER, RER, NVV, PPP and CAH.
these diseases are not assumed to occur. This was adjusted for PPP (RER) as
well.
Figure 7 shows the impacts of climate change for China. The CAH, PPP and
NVV scenarios share the same development, but have a different climate. The
market and non-market impacts increase as climate change gets worse. The MER,
NVV and RER scenario share the same climate, but have different development.
The market impacts are generally higher under MER, except in the first decades.
The impacts of climate change on Chinese agriculture are positive, and agriculture
is a larger part of the Chinese economy under MER than under NVV (RER). In later
years, the additional energy demand for air conditioning becomes more important.
As per capita income is greater under MER than under NVV (RER), demand for air-
conditioning is as well. However, energy efficiency is lower under NVV and hence
the costs of meeting the air conditioning demand higher; this effect dominates,
explaining why market impacts under NVV (RER) again exceed those under MER
in the later decades, and why eventually markets impacts under RER are higher
than under NVV (these two scenarios being largely indistinguishable prior to 2150).
EXCHANGE RATES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: AN APPLICATION OF FUND 73
-0.0005
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0.0025
0.003
0.0035
0.004
pe
rc
en
t G
D
P
MER
NVV
PPP
CAH
RER
0
0.0005
0.001
0.0015
0.002
0.0025
0.003
2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 2125 2150 2175 2200
2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 2125 2150 2175 2200
pe
rc
en
t G
D
P
MER
NVV
PPP
CAH
RER
Figure 8. The market (top panel) and non-market (bottom panel) impacts of climate change on
Subsaharan Africa according to the four scenarios, viz. MER, RER, NVV, PPP and CAH.
The non-market impacts are lower under MER than under NVV (RER) in the 21st
century, which reflects the value of the impacts rather than the impacts themselves.
In the 22nd century, the difference between MER and NVV (RER) impacts falls, for
the same reason; cf. Figure 2 which shows that Chinese MER income exceeds its
NVV (RER) income in the long run. The difference in non-market damage between
NVV and RER is minimal, as is the difference between per capita income.
Figure 8 shows the impacts of climate change for Sub-Saharan Africa. The
CAH, PPP and NVV scenarios share the same development, but have a different
climate. The market and non-market impacts increase as climate change gets worse.
The MER, RER and NVV scenario share the same climate, but have different
development. The market impacts are generally higher under MER, as people are
poorer and therefore more vulnerable. Market impacts are not strictly decreasing
in per capita income, however, as is shown by the changes in position of NVV
and RER; see the explanation for China’s market impacts above. The non-market
impacts are initially higher under MER than under CAH, which reflects the greater
incidence of vector-borne diseases, particularly malaria. However, because growth
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TABLE IV
Marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions ($/tC)
0% 1% 3%
PRTP SS EW SS EW SS EW
MER 36.4 38.6 7.2 7.5 −3.2 −5.4
CAH 52.8 58.3 3.0 5.2 −10.3 −11.4
PPP 60.5 67.4 5.7 8.5 −9.8 −10.7
NVV 69.3 77.8 8.9 12.4 −9.1 −9.8
RER 79.3 91.5 10.5 15.7 −9.9 −9.9
is faster under MER, malaria is eradicated earlier under that scenario, so that MER
impacts fall below CAH. Growth is slowest under RER; even though RER per
capita income is higher than MER per capita income in 2000, the RER income
threshold is also higher; as a result, malaria eradicated later under RER than under
CAH and MER, and non-market impacts remain high for a longer period.
Table IV shows the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions for
the five scenarios, for three alternative pure rates of time preference (0, 1 and
3%), and with and without equity weighting (cf. Fankhauser et al., 1997, 1998).
Comparison of the CAH, PPP and NVV scenarios shows that marginal impacts,
like total impacts, get worse if climate change is more severe and development is
the same. Comparison of MER on the one hand and NVV and RER on the other
hand shows the same ambiguity as seen in the market impacts of China and the
non-market impacts of Africa. In the short run, overall vulnerability is higher under
MER than under NVV and RER (see the results for a 3% PRTP), but in the long
run this is reversed. This ambiguity is enhanced by the fact that, although the pure
rate of time preference is equal, the social rate of discount is not. The social rate
of discount is used to discount current marginal damage costs to the net present
marginal damage costs shown in Table IV. The social rate of discount equals the
pure rate of time preference plus (the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to
consumption, which is unity, times) the growth rate of per capita consumption. The
latter is lowest under RER, followed by PPP and MER.
Furthermore, the global marginal damage costs cannot be directly compared, as
exchange rates are different. Table V shows the marginal damage costs for a 1%
PRTP and simple summation; Table III reproduces the key results. In Table V, the
regional marginal damage costs are computed for the five scenarios, converted to
MER/PPP/RER at 2000 exchange rates, and then added up. The patterns in Table V
are clearer than in Table IV. The same development, but worse climate change leads
to higher marginal damage costs. The same climate change, but lower development
leads to higher marginal damage costs. An exchange rate that makes developing
economics take a greater share in the global economy leads to higher marginal
damage costs.
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5. Emission Reduction Costs
The costs of emission reduction also differ between the different scenarios and
assumptions on the appropriate exchange rate. The first reason is straightforward.
If the aim is to keep carbon dioxide concentrations under 750 ppm, then this would
take some effort in the MER, RER and NVV scenarios, but less in the PPP scenario,
while in the CAH scenario concentrations do not exceed 750 ppm at all. The other
reasons are less straightforward. Many policy proposals assume that, in one way
or another, the responsibility for emission reduction reflects relative emissions.
Under the PPP and CAH scenarios, developing countries contribute much less to
climate change, and could therefore expect to carry less of the burden of emission
reduction. Many policy proposals foresee, in one way or another, where-flexibility,
allowing actual emission reduction to occur where that is cheapest. Exchange rates
play two roles here. Firstly, the marginal costs of emission reduction in, say, China
is higher if measured with a PPP exchange rate than with an MER exchange rate.
Secondly, most models, including the one used in this paper, assume, implicitly or
explicitly, that emission reduction is cheap (expensive) if emission intensity is high
(low). The choice of exchange rate also affects the measured emission intensity.
The implication of all this is that the choice of exchange rate affects the severity of
the target, the distribution of responsibility, the distribution of the efforts, and the
costs of emission abatement. The upshot is that little can be said in general about
the difference in costs of emission reduction between the different scenarios.
For specific targets and implementation architectures, comparisons can of course
be made. We assume that carbon dioxide concentrations need to stay below 550
ppm. We assume that emission reduction is implemented with full where and when
flexibility. As a result, marginal costs of emission reduction are equal for all regions,
and increase over time at the same rate as the rate of discount. (We ignore the issue
of who pays for emission reduction, but in a scenario like this, the amounts paid
would not substantially affect the economic growth path.)
Table III shows the net present value of the loss in consumption for Annex I and
other countries. MER, NVV and RER have the same global emission reduction. Yet,
costs are higher under NVV and RER than under MER because emission reduction
TABLE V
Marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions ($/tC)
at a 1% pure rate of time preference, simple sum
at MER at PPP at RER
MER 7.2 14.2 17.1
CAH 1.1 3.0 4.6
PPP 2.3 5.7 7.6
NVV 3.6 8.9 11.2
RER 3.2 8.4 10.5
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in developing countries is less cheap; there is a marked shift of emission reduction
to Annex I countries under NVV or RER relative to MER. NVV, PPP and CAH have
the same economic scenario, but different emissions and thus different emission
reduction targets. As baseline emissions get lower, emission reduction costs fall.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
An important thing to keep in mind is that the exchange rate used only affects eco-
nomic and emissions scenarios because the modelling approach commonly used
for scenario analysis compounds a series of imperfections. If we were to model the
development of each country separately based on the fundamental drivers of growth
of that country, without explicit or implicit assumptions about income or technology
convergence, and with price, income and substitution elasticities estimated sepa-
rately for that country, then the exchange rate would not affect the outcomes of the
model; it would only affect cross-country comparisons and regional aggregations
of the model results. The scenarios are only sensitive to the choice of exchange
rate because the scenarios assume per capita income and technology convergence;
because elasticities are estimated from international cross-sections; and because
countries are aggregated to regions.
The implications for long term economic and emissions projections are clear.
Applied work should be closer aligned with recent theoretical insights. Models
need to be better calibrated and validated. Parameters estimates should derive from
country-specific studies. The regional resolution of models should be increased.
Furthermore, theoretical work on the use of exchange rates in projections is required.
It will take years if not decades to complete this agenda. In the meantime, users of the
scenarios should be aware that, for some applications, the choice of exchange rate
matters. The uncomfortable truth, that the unit of measurement influences results,
is likely to remain.
The results shown here partly confirm those of Manne and Richels (2003), and
Holtsmark and Alfsen (2004a,b, 2005). The choice of exchange rate may affect
carbon dioxide emissions, but the effect on carbon dioxide concentrations would
be smaller, and the effect on climate smaller still. However, when we turn to the
impacts of climate change or the costs of emission reduction, differences may
become larger again. This contradicts Manne and Richels’ (2003), and Holtsmark
and Alfsen’s (2004a,b, 2005) conclusion that the choice of exchange rate does not
really matter, but then their analysis does not extend as far as this one.
Two main conclusions result from the analysis. Firstly, the choice of exchange
rate matters for climate change policy analysis. Unfortunately, it is not obvious
which exchange rate should be used. The market exchange rate is more appropriate
for that part of the analysis that deals with international market transactions, and the
real exchange rate is more appropriate for international welfare comparisons. The
choice of exchange rate thus depends on the aim of the analysis, but most analyses
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would be served best by presenting a sensitivity analysis around the exchange rate.
Secondly, the choice of exchange rate should not matter as much as it does. The
models used for climate change policy analysis should be improved.
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Notes
1 Strictly speaking, PPP exchange rates are not exchange rates in the sense that one can swap
currencies at this rate; rather, PPP “exchange rates” are measures of cross-country differences in price
levels.
2After the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC, there was also a flap about, inter alia, PPP
exchange rates; see Bruce (1995, 1996), Courtney (1996), Fankhauser and Tol (1995, 1996, 1997),
Grubb (1996), Masood (1995), Masood and Ochert (1995), Meyer (1995a,b), Meyer and Cooper
(1995), Nature (1995), O’Riordan (1997), D. Pearce (1995), F. Pearce (1995a,b), Sundaraman (1995),
and Tol (1997).
3Note that besides purchasing power parity exchange rate, there is also the purchasing power
parity theory, which holds that the purchasing power parity exchange rate would converge to unity.
In this paper, I only talk about the PPP exchange rate, and I make no explicit assumptions about its
convergence.
4 See Dixon and Rimmer (2004) for a discussion of the implications for modelling of incomplete
data coverage.
5 Estimating the relative price of a standard basket of goods is easy for two similar countries. It is
complicated for many different countries.
6 Many – including a referee of this journal and, until recently, the current author – dismiss the real
exchange rate as elegant but impractical; many think that one needs a computable general equilibrium
model to compute the RER; few seem to be aware that the RER can be and is measured.
7Note that three FUND regions, viz. Australia and New Zealand, Canada, and Japan and South
Korea, have a PPP that is lower than the MER. For these regions, a linearly force the PPP/MER ratio
to unity by 2020. The same procedure was used for RER, but not for Canada as its RER/MER exceeds
unity.
8McKibbin et al. (2004) also find much higher emissions under MER than under PPP; they correctly
argue that the link between GDP growth and emissions growth is only indirect, but I was unable to
find out what is assumed in the G-Cubed model.
9The CAH’ scenario is omitted from here onwards to simplify the exposition.
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